'Is it possible that advances in technology will mean that the arbitrary assumptions necessary to introduce money into rigorous theoretical models will become redundant, and that the world will come to resemble a pure exchange economy? Electronic settlements in real time hold out that possibility. ' King (1999) .
Introduction
The development of electronic, and in particular of computer, technology has led to speculation that electronic technology will replace fiat money in facilitating exchange. Just as barter was supplanted first by commodity money and then by fiat money because these were superior transactions technologies, so, it is argued, information storage and transmission will be so facilitated by computer technology that in its turn fiat money will be displaced.
It must be emphasised that this possibility, articulated by, for example, King (op cit) is not just that electronic technologies will provide people with easier access to their bank accounts, and thus make carrying notes and coins redundant -that e-money will replace fiat money. 'E-money' using schemes have already been tried: for surveys of them, see Gomez (2001) and Capie and Gomez (2002) . Rather the claim is that fiat money will disappear, and that with it will disappear also the notion of goods having prices quoted in terms of some unit of account which has something called purchasing power; we shall, in other words, return to barter. But it will be barter rendered so efficient by technology as to be superior to exchange through an intermediary commodity. This is the claim we are examining.
Central to analysis of this proposition is the medium-of-exchange function of money. The crucial distinction between a money-using economy and a barter economy, whether it is one of primitive or of electronic barter, is that in the former a medium of exchange is used. Our aim in this paper is to establish a simple formal framework which will let us examine the crucial determinants of whether or not a medium of exchange will be used. To do this, we construct a model of exchange with costs of transacting an intrinsic part of it; for if there are no costs of transacting then there are no transactions costs on which a medium of exchange can economise. This paper is set out as follows. Section 2 comprises the intuition of and historical background to our model. The model (set out in Section 3) is of an exchange economy; introducing production would be an unnecessary elaboration as we wish to analyse an exchange process. We base our analysis on the model developed by Shubik and Tsomocos (2002) . Within the model formal definitions of exchange by use of fiat money and exchange by electronic barter are provided and we derive the costs of exchange with fiat money and by electronic barter. We take as given that fiat money dominates commodity money. We derive the condition such that the cost of transacting with fiat money is lower than that of electronic barter (proposition 1) and also the condition under which the two mechanisms of trade become equivalent (proposition 2).
Section 4 sets out why in our model the issuer of fiat money (which we assume will be a central bank) will retain control of a concept called the price level. A formal demonstration of this point, in the framework of the model of Section 3, is also provided.
Section 5 summarises, and reiterates our main conclusions.
The role of money
As was observed some years ago by George Stigler (1972) , a world without transactions costs would seem a very strange place. There would be no firms -and therefore no banks, insurance companies, or other financial institutions. And further, there would be no money. The essence of our argument is that so long as there are transactions costs there will be money, and that even electronic barter will not, except under very special circumstances which we set out below, be able to replace 'fiat' money because it will not be as effective in reducing transactions costs. To develop the economic intuition underlying our model we first argue informally why some form of money to mediate trade in mass anonymous markets evolved as a device to reduce the costs of transacting. Then, we go on to show that once the concept of using money had developed, still further cost reductions were achieved by a further development -convergence to a very small number of commodities which were used as money. Indeed, a single money is, subject to certain constraints on its issuance, the optimal outcome. We would remark at this point that while all the subsequent arguments are set implicitly or explicitly in an exchange economy the conclusions would be expected to hold a fortiori in an economy with productions.
Just how useful money is in reducing the costs of transacting is highlighted by the fact that societies continue to use money even when inflation, and thus the cost of holding money, is very high. Although under the circumstances barter does eventually replace money, money has been used even when prices are rising by as much as 1,000% per annum.
(1) Why is the alternative, barter, so costly, and how does money reduce these costs?
(1) We show formally below (page 21) the condition which has to be satisfied for barter to drive out money.
Barter involves the double coincidence of wants. (Radford (1945) ). They were used because everyone could recognise them, and knew that everyone would accept them in any exchange. As that knowledge spreads about some good, that good becomes a medium of exchange. It might then acquire other roles -prices are likely to be quoted in it and it is likely to be used as a unit of account (McCallum (1989) ), and the government may require taxes to be paid in it.
We can thus see that a society will tend to evolve towards the use of a very few commodities as money, given our assumption that not all commodities are equally good at satisfying the medium of exchange function; and that one good will come to dominate if the marginal cost of acquiring information about that good falls the more it is used.
Not only does the use of money eliminate the need to know about the buyer in a transaction.
When it has evolved into use as a unit of account, another saving is achieved. (n(n-1)/ 2 to n. ' Meltzer (1998) .
So far we have argued that evolution to the use of a few commodities and subsequently to one commodity as money, is beneficial. Subject to certain constraints going beyond that brings still further benefits. Paper money, so long as there is not overissue that leads to inflation, brings a resource saving if it substitutes in whole or in part for the commodities which heretofore had served as money.
To summarise so far, we have argued that the concept and use of money emerged through a process of search and discovery. Its advantage over barter credit, which has some advantages over simple barter, is that it reduces transactions costs still further by shifting attention from the qualities of the prospective purchaser of a good to the qualities of what he is offering to pay for it.
From (in Allen Meltzer's words, op cit) 'a unique and possibly obscure set of attributes to a common and widely known set of attributes'. A money-using society requires less information than a bartering society.
Before going on to develop a formal demonstration of the above conclusions, and then to show their relevance to the future of electronic barter and paper money, it is useful to place the above arguments in their historical context, for the view of the development and role of money set out above is not new. A thorough exposition of it was provided over 100 years ago, by Carl Menger (1892).
(3) He maintained that money was a 'social' creation, a product of the invisible hand. His was an example of an invisible hand explanation -in contrast to a government-based explanation (2) It is not essential although it is probable that the medium of exchange also serve as unit of account. It would be possible for prices to be quoted in one thing -ounces of gold, say -while a national currency served as the medium of exchange. But each transaction would then need to be accompanied by a calculation converting the price (quoted in gold) into the national currency before payment could be made. There is thus a saving in having the medium of exchange and unit of account coincide. This can, however, be outweighed if the medium of exchange is changing value sufficiently rapidly.
The complete text of this paper has recently been translated in English and is available in Latzer and Schmitz (2002) .
Figure 1
Trade with seigniorage cost of fiat money
(Note that the labelling P 1 ,…,P H and similarly P 1 ,…,P H , P g indicate that all agents move simultaneously. Also, the arrows indicate that there is a continuum of their respective strategies.)
The model
We use the strategic market game developed in Shubik and Tsomocos (2002) . Money depreciates (ie it wears out through deterioration of notes and coins' quality) when used in exchange, and its replacement is costly. transactions need cash in advance (see footnote 11 for the motivation of this constraint). Thus, agents borrow fiat money to make their transactions. We assume that the money supply enters exogenously. Figure 1 shows the extensive form of the game. The exchange game is a one-period game with four subperiods. At each subperiod, as we explain below, an agent or a group of agents move. We first modify the game to admit both fiat money and electronic barter.
We conceptualise electronic barter mediated as through a giant clearing house run by an institution, perhaps the government. We then analyse the condition under which fiat money dominates electronic barter.
At the first move the government P g , determines the interest rate. At the second move, individuals, P 1 ,….,P H , obtain fiat money in the money market at the predetermined interest rate.
At the third move, individuals exchange commodities and the government buys inputs of production to be used in the replacement of depreciated fiat money. We maintain simplicity of strategy sets by assuming a continuum of traders, simultaneous moves, and a minimum of information at the second and the third stage. Then traders pay back their loans, and finally the government replaces depreciated money.
The government levies seigniorage costs to replenish depreciated money and also participates in exchange.
be the set of agents and
be the set of tradable commodities.
Each agent is endowed with a vector of commodities .
The following assumptions hold:
(ie every commodity is present in the economy).
(6) A more extensive presentation and discussion can be found in Shubik and Tsomocos (2002) .
(
(ie no agent has the null endowment of commodities).
(iii) h u is continuous, concave and strictly monotonic " H h Î .
(ie the more consumption the better).
Agents maximise their utility of consumption subject to the following constraints:
(ie expenditures in commodities £ borrowed money).
(ie sales of commodities £ endowment of commodities).
(ie loan repayment £ receipts from sales of commodities + money at hand).
where As can be seen from the budget constraints (1) and (3) receipts from sales of commodities cannot be used contemporaneously for financing purchases of other commodities. This is the essence of the cash-in-advance constraint which can also be thought as a liquidity constraint.
The exogenously fixed money supply M depreciates at a rate h . Thus, if the total amount of fiat money borrowed by the agents from the government (or central bank) is å
m and the expenditure of the government for the purchase of inputs of production is g then ( )
is the depreciated amount of money, since ( )
is the total amount of money in circulation.
The government's production function for money exhibits decreasing returns to scale in order to generate a unique optimum.
amount of fiat money produced, º g t x inputs of production.
We impose the standard technical assumptions on the government's production set,
that guarantee feasibility and the existence of a solution to the government's maximisation problem. 
+ If another technology were chosen, a unique equilibrium could be guaranteed by an exogenous institutional constraint, such as a price level target.
The government seeks to minimise interest rates because it simply aims to levy the necessary seigniorage to replace depreciated fiat money. Thus the government's optimisation problem becomes,
Where (5) is the amount of depreciated money that needs to be replaced, and (6) is the budget constraint of the government (ie its expenditures to finance the cost of production come from seigniorage).
The final allocations for the agents and the government are:
(ie consumption = initial endowment -sales + purchases).
Government purchases are all used in the production process, ie government does not obtain utility from consumption.
(9) Mathematically, minimisation of r is equivalent to maximise -r.
(government's inputs of production = money offered / prices).
Note that the relation between h and r is a complicated one and depends on gains from trade that in turn determine the volume of transactions. The interest rate r is set by the government to raise seigniorage revenue for the financing of fiat money production so as the replace depreciated money.
Finally, a Nash equilibrium (NE) or ( )
is a set of strategy choices,
; " h H Î and the government, and
where
are the choice sets of the agents and the government (ie Prices are formed using the Dubey and Shubik (1978) price formation mechanism. Prices are by that mechanism formed as the ratio of the aggregate cash bid in a particular market to the aggregate quantity of commodities offered for sale. This is equivalent to an equilibrium condition; its accounting clarity allows for cash flows in the economy to be traced precisely.
(10) Without loss of generality, we consider the case of perfect competition (ie a continuum of agents). Thus, agents regard prices as fixed in the optimisation problems.
The existence and inefficiency theorems for these outcomes are stated and proved in Shubik and Tsomocos (2002) . Here we will focus our attention on the relative efficiency of using alternative means of payments (on fiat money versus electronic barter).
Trade with fiat money versus electronic barter
We conceptualise exchange using fiat money as follows. Consider a simple case in which L=4.
Fiat money can be exchanged against every commodity but commodities cannot be exchanged with each other. Figure 2 describes the situation. The arcs connecting m with commodities 1, 2, 3, and 4 indicate that money can be exchanged against all commodities. On the other hand, commodities cannot be exchanged with each other (ie there are no arcs connecting them). we assume that commodities can be exchanged with each other, perhaps via an accounting device of e-barter, which now becomes the stipulated means of exchange, through a clearing house that matches demand and supply. In this case there will be
markets, ie, six markets (11) Note that the constraint that goods cannot be directly exchanged for goods is not imposed but naturally emerges as a consequence of our prior argument that trade with money dominates primitive barter.
altogether.
(12) Thus, in Figure 3 arcs connect all commodities with each other indicating that exchange occurs via electronic barter.
Let us assume that the combined cost of gathering and then processing information on each transaction is c. On the other hand trade with fiat money, by virtue of its anonymity, divisibility, fungibility and its other properties does not require any additional costs except its production and replacement costs. These are covered in its production process as described in (4). Also, information costs concerning the creditworthiness of borrowers in a fiat money economy are dealt by commercial banks and not by the original issuers of money (ie central banks) or by those who accept money in exchange for goods or services. These costs cannot be avoided by the operators of the central clearing house (or a similar transactions institution) that implements electronic barter. Then the total cost of exchange with e-barter is:
We note that each agent participates in only one side of the market since wash sales (ie the same individual participating in both sides of a particular market) are not profitable in a strategic market game without oligopolistic effects. If we assume that set-up costs for establishing either of the two market structures are negligible we have proposition 1. We also note that the total cost of fiat money and of electronic barter is endogenously determined; both depend on the volume of transactions; see equations (6) and (11).
Proposition 1:
The cost of exchange with fiat money is lower than exchange with e-barter provided that,
The cost of exchange with fiat money is å ÎH h h v r (*), since replacement of depreciated money is financed by seigniorage which is levied by interest rates.
(12) Extensive discussion on various market structures and how these affect exchange is contained in Shubik (1999) . (13) We implicitly assume that we are in equilibrium such that agents participate in all markets.
Hence, (11)
represents the cost difference of exchange with electronic barter versus fiat money.
One point can usefully be made here about this relationship. If we imagine technical progress lowering c, the very same process is likely to increase the number of commodities, L. Indeed, over time we have seen a proliferation of traded commodities most of them being associated with technical progress. Note also that while the lower bound of r is zero, that of c is inevitably above zero.
Proposition 1 underlines the fact that fiat money is a decoupling device that economises on transaction costs regardless from where they emanate (ie processing, information acquisition etc).
On the other hand, electronic barter is a centralised accounting mechanism that requires detailed knowledge of every transaction. Thus, it inevitably entails higher aggregate costs in complicated market systems with multiple markets and commodities. It is not a coincidence that the advent of money (or equivalently the decline of barter) occurred contemporaneously with the development of the market system.
Proposition 2:
The equilibria of ( ) 
Then, regardless whether trade is conducted with fiat or through electronic barter the same equilibrium obtains. A natural question that emerges from this analysis is whether it is possible for both fiat money and electronic barter to coexist in equilibrium. In particular, whether fiat money can be used for a subset of commodities and electronic barter for the rest. This issue is complicated and beyond the scope of our present analysis, since the volume of transactions with each medium of exchange is endogenously determined and in turn determines the subset of commodities whose trade might occur with each medium of exchange. Also, the gains from trade of each commodity influence the marginal benefit and cost using different methods of financing trade. For example, if there exist big gains from trade in a specific commodity, the government may reduce the marginal cost of trading in that market by introducing electronic barter and thus avoiding depreciation of fiat money used in this particular very liquid market. We plan to explore this question in future research.
The price level -meaningful and determinate
The intrinsic informational superiority of central bank issued base money will ensure that demand for it is not extinguished by the growth of e-barter. Demand will remain from the non-bank public, and, because of that, derived demand will remain from the banking sector. The central bank will thus retain control of short-term interest rates. (15) This might seem at first glance sufficient for it to retain control of the price level; for in many models a short rate is the (15) We do not imply that without such demand it would lose control of short rates. The argument in Goodhart (op cit) that the central bank can control rates through its being able to sustain losses seems to us to be correct, despite objections of Selgin and White (2002) .
sole transmitter of monetary policy actions. For example, much recent work on monetary policy uses small macroeconomic models which include an IS function analogous to that in a basic IS-LM model. These can be backward looking, and thus very close to the traditional specification (eg Fuhrer and Moore (1995) ), or forward looking, embodying rational expectations (eg McCallum and Nelson (1999a) ). But whatever the specification, a common feature is that demand for current output is a function of the real rate of interest. Monetary policy in such models therefore affects output and inflation only through its effects on the real rate of interest;
the money supply has no direct role. As we have shown, however, that a demand for base money will survive competition from electronic barter, it is useful briefly at this point to review some aspects of the work which suggests that focusing on a short-term interest rate as the sole transmitter of monetary policy impulses is certainly too narrow and is also very possibly misleading.
Viewing the short rate as the sole transmitter of monetary policy is unnecessarily restrictive both theoretically and empirically. Allan Meltzer (1999a) has recently summarised the body of theory and evidence which considers that specification to be inadequate. He argued that although, so long as prices are sticky the real interest rate is affected by central bank operations, so too is the real monetary base, and changes in the latter affect aggregate demand in ways additional to the effect of changes in the real interest rate. Meltzer (1999b) reports empirical results for the United States which support this argument, as does Nelson (2000) for the United Kingdom.
(The result is not novel; earlier work (eg Mills and Wood (1977) (1990) reports results which support this; but others (eg McCallum (1999) ) suggest that the coefficient on real balances is likely to be small.
A direct role for base money is perhaps better defended and explained by an approach with much earlier origins. David Hume (1752) thought that money affected the economy through a wide variety of channels, and expressed this thought in a metaphor -water flowing from one place to another -that frequently recurs in the discussions of the money transmission process.
'Money always finds its way back again by a hundred canals, of which we have not notion or suspicion….For above a thousand years, the money of Europe has been flowing to Rome, by one open and sensible current; but it has been emptied by many secret and insensible canals. ' (page 48, 1955 reprint) .
The many channels view is also articulated by Friedman and Schwartz (1982, pages 486-87) .
'…The attempt to correct portfolio imbalances (resulting from an increase in the money stock) raises the prices of the sources of service flows relative to the flows themselves which leads to an increase in spending both on the service flows and then produce a new source of service flows….Sooner or later the acceleration in nominal income will have to take the form of rising prices, since the initial position was assumed to be one of equilibrium and we have introduced nothing to change the long-run trend of nominal income.'
This argument is also expressed in Brunner and Meltzer (1993) and was stated very succinctly in Meltzer (1999b) He also argues (1999a) that money balances are crucial in this interpretation of the transmission mechanism. He sees '…the gap between desired and actual real balances as a measure of the relative price adjustment required to restore full equilibrium'. An implication of this is that money demand is a function of many interest rates, and that many interest rates therefore affect aggregate demand. (See also Friedman (1956) .) A model which captured all these effects would (17) See Wood (1995) for a discussion of the development of the quantity theory and the history of the 'water' metaphor.
be very complex. It would incorporate several -possibly many -interest rates, and therefore many assets with imperfect substitutability between them. Nelson (op cit) sets out a basic version of such a model, arguing that a long rate, not just a short rate, should appear in an optimising IS specification; the argument is based on the expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates.
Our formal model (Section 3) which compared fiat money with electronic barter also yields the result that control of the issue of fiat money controls the price level without any intermediation through an interest rate channel. Our model manifests real as well as nominal determinacy. This Mills and Wood (1982) provide some evidence on the role of a long-term rate in money demand functions.
perfectly flexible in this model. They are changed only after transactors have sorted out permanent from temporary and real from nominal shocks, and done such things as compare the costs of price change against those of inventory adjustment. (For an elaboration of this argument, see Clower (1969) .) Thus, the very presence of information costs, an important component of transactions costs on which money can economise, serves to constrain the optimal domain of any individual money.
Conclusion
In this paper we first set out the argument (a very traditional one) that money evolved to reduce transaction costs by economising on information.
A formal model in which money existed by virtue of that property was then developed, and the costs of operating a fiat money system were compared with the costs of operating a system of electronic barter. The key cost parameters were identified, and it was shown that within this framework fiat money dominates -is cheaper than -electronic barter, unless inflation drives up the nominal interest rate, that increases in the number of commodities increase the costs of electronic barter faster than they do the costs of using fiat money, and that the lower bound to the cost of using fiat money is always below that of electronic barter. Thus fiat money is a superior transaction technology to electronic barter; transaction chains that use it have intrinsically lower information requirements. The resulting demand for fiat money by the non-bank public will in turn give rise to demand by the banking sector. Their joint demands will ensure both that central banks survive, and that they will retain control of a price level measured in the money they issue.
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